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Gargano: An Act of War

AN ACT OF WAR:
FINDING A MEANING FOR WHAT CONGRESS HAS LEFT
UNDEFINED
Desiree Gargano*

I.

INTRODUCTION

What would happen if you were one of the brilliant, successful entrepreneurs who owned a beautiful glass-steel skyscraper in a
busy city and your building was destroyed as an unforeseen violent
act against your country, leaving behind burning rubble that released
hazardous toxins into the community through the air, water run-off
and other source points?1 There would surely be residual mercury
left from your fluorescent lights, lead and possibly cadmium from the
many computers you had housed, traces of asbestos that the builders
may have used when they constructed your building, and do not forget about all of the glass and concrete scattered in pieces around your
property as well as the community.2 When the time comes to determine who is liable for the cleanup costs, property owners have generally faced strict liability for the release of hazardous waste under section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
*

J.D. Candidate December 2012, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg School of Law; B.A.
Long Island University, C.W. Post Campus; major in Philosophy, minor in International Politics and Government. I would like to thank my father, Mark Gargano, for aiding and supporting me through the many years of higher education, enabling me to achieve my dreams
and goals. I would also like to thank my mother and stepfather, Kathy and Shayne Worley,
for their love and support from across the country; it hasn‘t been easy being so far apart, but
they have always done everything they can to help me be the best student and well-rounded
person possible.
1
This scenario has already occurred in the United States. See infra Part V (discussing the
terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, and how the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-28 (2006), may
apply).
2
See Anita Gates, Buildings Rise From Rubble While Health Crumbles, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/11/arts/television/11dust.html?r=1&ref=nyregionspecial3
(describing the residual effects from the destruction of the World Trade Center).
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Compensation, and Liability Act (hereinafter ―CERCLA‖).3 Thus, in
the hypothetical question presented, it does not matter whether you
intended for your skyscraper to come tumbling down and pollute the
environment, as the property owner, you could be held liable as a responsible party for the hazardous wastes released from or as a result
of the destruction of your building.4
CERCLA provisions generally address the cleanup of hazardous wastes already released into the environment, as opposed to preventing the release of hazardous waste before an event occurs.5
CERCLA is also frequently referred to as the ―Superfund‖ because of
the provision designed to clean up hazardous waste sites that have
been abandoned or closed.6 A property owner may raise certain defenses when called upon for cleanup costs under CERCLA on the basis of an act of God, act of war or the unrelated fault of a third party.7
However, the particular defense of an act of war has only been raised
once and has never been successfully asserted, thereby raising the
question of whether the defense is a ―dead letter‖8 or if there can ever
be circumstances in which the defense would prove useful.9 If your
skyscraper is destroyed by a terrorist committing a hostile act against
the United States—an act that is recognized by the United States as a
reason to initiate a war—it would seem only fair for you, the property
owner, to be able to defend against liability costs because the hazardous waste was created or caused by ―an act of war‖ and not by any
3

42 U.S.C. § 9607.
Id.
5
Compare CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-28 (addressing the cleanup of hazardous waste
that has already been released and the recovery of costs associated with such cleanup), with
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [hereinafter referred to as ―RCRA‖], 42 U.S.C. §§
6901-92 (helping to prevent the release of hazardous wastes by ―giv[ing] the [Environmental Protection Agency] the authority to control hazardous waste from the ‗cradle-to-grave‘ ‖)
(quoting EPA, Laws and Regulations: Summary of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/rcra.html (last updated on Feb 24, 2012)).
6
See
EPA,
Superfund:
CERCLA
Overview,
EPA.GOV,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm (last updated on Dec. 12, 2011) (explaining
that ―[CERCLA], commonly known as Superfund, was enacted by Congress on December
11, 1980 . . . . CERCLA: . . . established a trust fund to provide for cleanup when no responsible party could be identified‖).
7
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (listing four types of defenses).
8
See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining dead letter as ―[a] law or practice that, although not formally abolished, is no longer used, observed, or enforced‖).
9
See infra Part III.a (discussing United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th
Cir. 2002), the only environmental case that addresses the defense of an act of war pursuant
to an action brought under CERCLA, which as the court points out never defined an act of
war).
4
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fault of your own. Nonetheless, there remains uncertainty as to: (1)
whether the CERCLA defense covers only an ―act of war‖ by the
United States that causes the creation and/or release of hazardous
waste,10 or whether the defense also includes action by another country against the United States;11 and (2) what an ―act of war‖ actually
means within the context of the CERCLA statute.
This Comment examines why the act of war defense has consistently failed and determines if the law places too high of a burden
on property owners who assert this defense. Part II of this article describes the liability standards under CERCLA, explains the types of
defenses that people may raise against CERCLA liability and addresses the legislative history of the act of war defense clause, including a discussion of the lack of available legislative history. Part III
analyzes the environmental case history and discusses how cases in
other areas of the law have approached finding a meaning for an ―act
of war.‖ Part IV proposes a test for property owners to successfully
assert the defense of an act of war and Part V explores when this defense could effectively be used going forward.
II.

CERCLA LIABILITY
A.

Generally

CERCLA liability applies to property owners in three distinct
ways: (1) if the person or entity is—or has been in the past—the
owner or operator of the facility; (2) if the person or entity is the arranger of the waste disposal; or (3) if the person or entity accepts hazardous waste for treatment or disposal.12 The scope of CERCLA extends to a facility or vessel from which there is ―any spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing into the environment . . . .‖13
This applies only to hazardous substances, which CERCLA defines
in relation to other listed substances designated for regulation under
10
See infra Part III.a.i (discussing the Shell Oil case where the United States‘ involvement
in World War II led to an increase in demand for ―avgas‖ and caused an increase in the production of hazardous waste).
11
See infra Part V (discussing whether the defense of an ―act of war‖ could apply to the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001).
12
42 U.S.C. § 6907(a)(2)-(4).
13
42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
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other environmental acts.14 CERCLA also broadly defines environment to include a wide assortment of surface waters (navigable waters and oceans), ground water, ―land surface or subsurface strata, or
ambient air within the United States or under the jurisdiction of the
United States.‖15
If a release of hazardous waste occurs, the Environmental
Protection Agency (hereinafter ―EPA‖) may engage in two types of
responses: quick removal and long-term remediation.16 Both are
complex and costly operations in which potentially responsible parties (hereinafter ―PRPs‖) will be involved to minimize the costs and
pay for the cleanup.17 Under section 107(a) of CERCLA, any person
or entity found to be involved in the creation, disposal or handling of
the hazardous substance will be subject to liability, unless the person
or entity is able to qualify under a defense.18
There are four defenses a property owner may raise against
charges under CERCLA and, if successful, will relieve the owner of
liability for hazardous waste.19 These four defenses are found in
CERCLA section 107(b), which states:
There shall be no liability. . . [if the] release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by—(1) an act of God; (2) an
act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party other
than an employee or agent of the defendant, . . . if the
14
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(A)-(F) (defining hazardous substances as: ―(A) any substance
designated pursuant to section 311(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [33
U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A)], (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42
U.S.C. § 6921] . . . (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 307(a) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)], (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. § 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to
section 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act [15 U.S.C. § 2606].‖).
15
42 U.S.C. § 9601(8))(A)-(B).
16
KATHRYN L. SCHROEDER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 188 (Robert L. Serenka, Jr., et al. eds.,
2008); see also EPA, supra note 6 (describing the two types of actions authorized under the
law as: ―Short-term removals, where actions may be taken to address releases or threatened
releases requiring prompt response‖ and ―Long-term remedial response actions, that permanently and significantly reduce the dangers associated with releases or threats of releases of
hazardous substances that are serious, but not immediately life threatening‖).
17
SCHROEDER, supra note 16, at 189.
18
42 U.S.C. § 6907(a)(1)-(4).
19
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(4).
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defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the
hazardous substance concerned, . . . and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of
any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or (4)
any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.20
Of the four potential defenses, as briefly mentioned before, the defense of ―an act of war‖ has never been successfully raised.21
B.

Legislative History

The explicit language of the defense in CERCLA section 107
specifies that the ―act of war‖ must be the sole cause of the release of
hazardous waste.22 Other than this limitation within the statutory
language, CERLA provides no explanation for what an ―act of war‖
is meant to cover.23
The legislative history of CERCLA does not include any explanation for the inclusion of ―an act of war,‖ but it does describe the
manner or method in which CERCLA is to be applied.24 In the Congressional Record, Representative Florio stated: ―The standard of liability . . . is intended to be the same as that provided in section 311 of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; that is, strict liability.‖25
Additionally, when Congress used the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (hereinafter ―SARA‖) to amend CERCLA, the
House Report stated, ―liability under CERCLA is strict, that is, without regard to fault or willfulness.‖26 The draftsmen of CERCLA
seemed to have intended a presumption of liability against any PRP.
20

Id.
See infra Part III a.ii (discussing case law under CERCLA for the ―act of war‖ defense
and explaining why the defense failed when it was raised).
22
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2).
23
See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1993), aff’d, 281
F.3d 812, 827 (9th Cir. 2002), opinion withdrawn and superseded on denial of rehearing,
294 F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1147 (2003) (stating: ―[t]he term
‗act of war‘ is undefined in CERCLA and, though familiar from common usage, does not
disclose its parameters on its face‖).
24
Cong. Rec. – House H11787, Dec. 3, 1980 (remarks of Rep. Florio), reprinted in 2
SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 168 (Helen Cohn Needham ed., 1982).
25
Id.
26
Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. at 971 n.3 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 253, Pt. 1 at 74 (1986)
(SARA)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21
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This presumption of liability and strict liability standard under
CERCLA places a heavy burden of proof on any property owner who
attempts to assert a defense.
American law does not clearly identify what ―an act of war‖
27
means. ―An act of war‖ is a term of art borrowed from international
law, which defines it as a ―use of force or other action by one state
against another‖ which ―[t]he state acted against recognizes . . . as an
act of war, either by use of retaliatory force or a declaration of war.‖28
An environmental law commentator ―has opined that the act of war
defense presumes ‗governmental sponsorship‘ and ‗formalization of
hostilities,‘ and contemplates ‗a confrontation of organized forces,
acts of state, massive violence, and overwhelming influence that are
unlikely to be found in the domestic Superfund context.‘ ‖29 In addition, only one case in American history raised an act of war defense
under CERCLA and the judges had to determine what the defense
was meant to cover.30
III.

CASE LAW
A.

Environmental Case Law Addressing CERCLA
Section 107(b) Act of War Defense
1. United States v. Shell Oil Co.31

United States v. Shell Oil Co. was an action brought under
CERCLA for the hazardous waste dumped by oil companies from the
manufacturing of aviation fuel that increased during World War II.32

27
See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 26, 1614 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed. 1990) (providing
no definition for ―act of war‖; however, ―act‖ is defined as an ―[s]omething done or performed, esp. voluntarily; a deed . . . [t]he process of doing or performing‖ and ―war‖ is defined as a ―[h]ostile conflict by means of armed forces, carried on between nations, states, or
rulers, or sometimes between parties within the same nation or state; a period of such conflict‖).
28
JAMES R. FOX, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 6 (1992).
29
Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. at 971 (quoting 4 William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental
Law: Hazardous Wastes and Substances § 8.13(C)(3)(c) (1992)).
30
See Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1061 (discussing the lack of precedents on which to base
the court‘s decision).
31
294 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002).
32
Id. at 1048.
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It is the only environmental law case which addresses the CERCLA
section 107(b) ―act of war‖ defense. The defendants were a group of
oil companies located in and around Los Angeles, which controlled
and operated refineries for aviation fuel.33 During the war, when
business increased for the defendants, the defendants disposed of
their excess refinery waste at a location known as the McColl site.34
The facts of the underlying dispute concerning the hazardous
waste dumped at the McColl site were provided to the court in a stipulation between the parties.35 In the 1930s, new technology for aviation fuel, nicknamed ―avgas,‖ was developed; the United States military became a major consumer at the onset of World War II.36
Manufacturers used sulfuric acid in the manufacturing process to
create a necessary compound additive called ―alkylate,‖ which
caused the acid to reduce in purity; the ―spent acid either could be
used in other refinery processes, or could be dumped . . . .‖37 Production of avgas increased significantly during the war, increasing both
the use of sulfuric acid as well as the production of spent acid.38
President Franklin D. Roosevelt established multiple agencies
to oversee production of avgas during World War II, including the
War Production Board (hereinafter ―WPB‖) and the Petroleum Administration for War (hereinafter ―PAW‖).39 Even though these
agencies were given power over the oil companies, contractual
agreements were still used to guarantee production.40 The United
States entered long-term contracts with the oil companies to build
more plants and produce more avgas, but the facilities remained in
the private ownership of the oil companies.41
During the period of increased production, the oil companies
used the spent alkylation acid in various refinery processes.42 A result of the use of spent alkylation acid was the production of acid
sludge.43 Acid sludge was too low in purity to be reprocessed and
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1049.
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1049.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1049-50.
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1050.
Id.
Id.
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because there were high costs associated with certain disposal methods, the acid sludge was typically dumped or burned.44
During 1944 and 1945, oil companies were operating at increased rates which resulted in a ―bottlenecking‖ where large
amounts of the spent alkylation acid were dumped at the McColl
site.45 The government attempted to aid the acid waste generation
problem and leased the Wilshire Storage Tank in Southern California—a large container meant to hold and store vast amounts of hazardous waste.46 However, the defendants continued dumping and
entering disposal contracts to place the acid sludge and spent alkylation acid at the McColl site.47 Dumping at the McColl site began in
1942 and continued until after the end of World War II.48 The court
estimated that by the end of the dumping activity, nearly 82.5% of the
hazardous waste found at the McColl site was comprised of acid
sludge that resulted from using the spent alkylation acid to treat nonavgas refinery products, while only 12% of the hazardous waste consisted of spent sulfuric acid and 5.5% was the acid sludge that occurred from treating government-owned benzol.49
In the 1990s, the government began excavating and removing
the waste from the McColl site and incurred an approximate cost of
$100 million.50 The United States and the State of California sued
the oil companies under CERCLA to recover the costs incurred during the cleanup of the McColl site.51 The oil companies relied upon
CERCLA‘s section 107(b) defense provision for release of hazardous
waste caused by an ―act of war.‖52
The district court, in the lower court proceedings for the Shell
Oil Co. case, rejected the ―act of war‖ defense raised by the oil companies but ―held that 100% of the cleanup costs for all the waste, including the benzol waste, should be allocated to the United States,
and 0% to the Oil Companies, under 42 U.S.C. §
9613(f)(1)[Contributions].‖53 The United States appealed the district
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id.
Id. at 1051.
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1051.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Shell Oil Co., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1024-25 (C.D. Cal. 1998)).
Id. at 1051.
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1048.
Id.
Id. (citing Shell Oil Co., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1030). The statute cited states in relevant

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss1/12

8

Gargano: An Act of War

2012]

AN ACT OF WAR

155

court‘s decision and the oil companies cross-appealed the dismissal
of their defense.54 Ultimately the Court of Appeals reversed the district court only on its holding of liability for the United States.55 The
Ninth Circuit instead held the United States was only liable for the
benzol waste—for which it was an arranger—and not the non-benzol
waste.56
Unlike actions in which private parties are held liable, the
United States could be held liable under CERCLA as an arranger only because CERCLA contains a waiver of sovereign immunity.57
Had CERCLA contained no such waiver, there would have been no
issue as to partial liability of the United States government. Relying
on the precedent of Lane v. Pena,58 the Ninth Circuit in Shell Oil Co.
explained that plaintiffs were required to ―point to an ‗unequivocal
expression‘ of intent to waive sovereign immunity,‖ and ―[a] waiver
of sovereign immunity must be ‗unambiguous[ ],‘ and the relevant
statutory language is to be ‗strictly construed‘ in favor of the sovereign.‖59 The United States argued for a narrower reading of the statute to only apply when the ―government acts as a ‗nongovernmental
entity.‘ ‖60 The circuit court, however, held that the United States‘
interpretation was too narrow and no such limit to CERCLA‘s waiver
of sovereign immunity existed.61 The waiver of sovereign immunity
in CERCLA was important because the provision allowed the court
to hold the United States responsible at least for the benzol portion of
the hazardous waste, regardless of whether the ―act of war‖ defense
raised by the defendants was successful.62
After analyzing the degree of control the United States actualpart: ―In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable
parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.‖ 42 U.S.C. §
9613(f)(1).
54
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1048.
55
Id. at 1048-49.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 1051-52; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (2006) (stating ―[e]ach department,
agency, and instrumentality of the United States (including the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the
same manner . . . as any nongovernmental entity . . . .‖).
58
518 U.S. 187 (1996).
59
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1051 (citing Lane, 518 U.S. at 192 (1996)).
60
Id. at 1052.
61
Id. at 1052-53.
62
See id. at 1060-61 (holding that the United States was responsible for one-hundred percent of the benzol cleanup).
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ly exercised over the non-benzol waste generation, the court reversed
the district court and instead held ―that the United States was not an
arranger under § 9607(a)(3) with respect to non-benzol waste, even
under a broad theory of arranger liability.‖63 The United States had
never been an owner of any of the manufacturing products.64 Rather,
the United States acted as a consumer and only owned the finished
product.65 Even though the United States had the authority to control
the manufacturing processes, neither the United States nor its employees ever exercised any actual control in any form.66 Unlike the
non-benzol waste, the court agreed with the district court that the
United States was liable for one hundred percent of the cleanup costs
relating to the benzol waste.67 The court supported the district court
on this point because the United States conceded that it was the arranger for all of the benzol waste.68 The court held that the lower
court ―did not abuse its discretion in choosing the factors on which to
rely in determining allocation, nor did it clearly err in applying those
factors to the benzol waste.‖69
Since the court held that the United States was only liable for
the government-owned benzol waste, the court reanalyzed the defendants‘ argument—defense against liability—that the non-benzol
waste was caused by an act of war.70 In determining whether the oil
companies could successfully raise the defense of ―an act of war‖ under section 107 of CERCLA, the court affirmed the determination of
the district court.71 The court specifically referenced the fact that ―an
act of war‖ is not defined within CERCLA and further stated that
there is ―no case law exploring the extent of the defense.‖72 The
court deferred to the district court‘s comparison of the broad language used in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), which imposes liability, with the
narrower § 9607(b), which presents defenses.73 When trying to determine the meaning of the defense, the district court conducted an
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 1059.
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1056.
Id. at 1056.
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1060-61.
Id. at 1060.
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1060.
Id.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1061.
Id. (citing Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. at 970-72).
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analysis of the structure of CERCLA and found that ―the provisions
imposing liability under CERCLA are sweeping in their language and
scope, while the provisions exempting parties from liability are narrowly drawn.‖74 Furthermore, the legislative history of CERCLA
provided no explanation of ―an act of war‖ and instead ―emphasize[d]
that CERCLA was to be a strict liability statute with narrowly construed exceptions.‖75
The district court had found that the term ―act of war‖ was
―borrowed from international law, where it is defined as a ‗use of
force or other action by one state against another‘ which ‗the state
acted against recognizes . . . as an act of war, either by use of retaliatory force or a declaration of war.‘ ‖76 The court further relied upon
treatises and case law from other contexts outside of environmental
law to determine that ―an act of war‖ should be very narrowly construed and, therefore, rejected the broad argument put forward by the
oil companies that it should include an action taken under the authority of the War Powers Clause in Article I of the United States Constitution.77 The court held that the disposal of hazardous waste resulting
from avgas production could not be ―caused ‗solely‘ by an act of war,
as required by that section,‖ because the oil companies were dumping
waste from more than just avgas production, they had alternative disposal options and the disposal was occurring before, during and after
World War II.78 The focus on this holding should be the court‘s and
the legislature‘s use of the word ―solely‖ in relation to the cause of
the release. ―Solely‖ is an adverb that is defined as ―not involving
anyone or anything else.‖79 Therefore, the oil companies appropriately were not entitled to the defense of ―an act of war‖ for their liability
resulting from the disposal of hazardous waste at the McColl site because the waste production was caused by more than the govern74

Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. at 970.
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1061 (emphasis added); see also Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp.
at 971 (stating the ―legislative histories of both CERCLA and SARA indicate beyond any
doubt that CERCLA‘s sponsors intended the scheme of liability under CERCLA to be, in
effect, one of strict liability and the defenses enumerated in section 107(b) to be narrowly
construed‖).
76
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1061 (quoting Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. at 972).
77
Id. at 1061-62. Congress has the power: ―To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.‖ U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 11.
78
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1062 (emphasis added).
79
NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1661 (Angus Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg
eds., 3d ed. 2010).
75
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ment‘s increased need for avgas.80
2.

Why the Defense of an Act of War Failed in
United States v. Shell Oil Co.

The oil companies‘ attempt to assert the defense of ―act of
war‖ for liability under CERCLA failed for a variety of reasons. The
court specifically emphasized that the statutory language requires the
―act of war‖ to be the exclusive cause of the release of hazardous
waste.81 Even though the oil companies dumped the hazardous waste
in part because of the increased production for the wartime efforts, a
large portion of the hazardous waste at the McColl site was a result of
reprocessing the spent acid in production of materials other than avgas which were not used or meant for use in World War II. 82 Moreover, the production and disposal of the acid sludge resulted from a
consensual contract between the oil companies and the government;
the contract and the production of avgas in California had no actual
proximity to any hostile or military acts that were occurring during
that time period.83
In its brief, the United States presented a very compelling argument that ―an act of war‖ should be given the narrowest interpretation possible.84 The United States asserted that:
The narrowest and most plausible interpretation is that
an act of war is an act involving military combat during wartime. Although there is little case law or legislative history illuminating what the term ―act of war‖
means in CERCLA, Congress most likely included the
defense because there are no reasonable measures that
parties can take to protect their facilities against damage or destruction from military combat.85
The court particularly took issue with the timing of the dumping in relation to World War II because production of acid sludge oc80

Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1062.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 1049-50.
84
Second Brief for the United States as Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 18-20, United States
v. Shell Oil, Co., 294 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 00-55027, 00-55077), 2000 WL
35458907.
85
Id. at 18.
81
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curred before the war and dumping of the acid sludge extended after
the war.86 Acid sludge was being produced as a byproduct of other
refinery processes and dumped before avgas was ever produced for
the purposes of World War II.87 Additionally, while the war may
have increased the production of acid sludge at a significant rate, the
dumping at the McColl site was used for more than just the acid
sludge created by wartime avgas production.88 Although science
might be able to be used to chemically separate and measure benzol
waste from non-benzol waste,89 the court did not have an accurate
method to measure how much acid sludge was specifically caused by
wartime refining activities exclusively;90 thus, there could be no apportionment of the dumping between wartime and non-wartime activities.91 Had there been a way to accurately measure what portion of
the non-benzol waste was directly caused by the wartime refining activities, the court might have been more willing to allow the act of
war defense for at least that portion of the waste.
While World War II may have increased the production of
avgas in order to meet the United States‘ increased needs—which
thereby caused an increase in the production and dumping of acid
sludge—the court was correct to determine that the dumping at the
McColl site did not qualify under CERCLA‘s act of war defense.92
The plain language of the statute does make clear that an act of war
must be the sole cause of the release of hazardous substances into the
environment.93 The court‘s holding set a narrow standard for the interpretation of the defense‘s plain-language meaning in the future—
the limiting language of ―sole cause‖ must be strictly applied to the
entire release of any hazardous substances. An apportionment of the
hazardous substances was not appropriate in this case because the de86
See Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1050-51, 1062 (discussing how the acid sludge was a
known by-product before the war, dumping at the specific McColl site extended past the end
of the war and most of the acid sludge at the McColl site was a result from non-avgas refinery products; thus, the defendants could not establish that World War II was the ―sole‖
cause of the dumping for which the defendants were held liable).
87
Id. at 1050.
88
See id. at 1051 (―82.5% of the waste [at the McColl site] . . . was acid sludge resulting
from the chemical treatment of non-avgas refinery products using spent alkylation acid.‖).
89
See Shell Oil Co., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1024-25 (discussing the different theories each party has in methods that could be used to calculate the presence of certain materials).
90
Id. at 1025.
91
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1048-49; see also Shell Oil Co., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1023.
92
Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1048-49.
93
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
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fendants raised the defense against liability for the entire McColl site,
not just for the portion of acid sludge caused by completing orders for
avgas placed by the United States during World War II.94 A defendant cannot use the defense to attempt to mitigate liability and be
held responsible for the only parts of the hazardous waste that do not
qualify, but rather, the standard for the defense is all or nothing.95
Assuming the majority of the acid sludge was a result of the avgas
materials produced for World War II, it would not have made a difference in the court‘s holding because a portion of hazardous waste
dumped was caused by non-wartime refinery processes with no way
to measure how much of the waste was attributable to the war; the act
of war, which was the United States‘ involvement in World War II,
was never the sole or exclusive cause of the release of hazardous substances as required by CERCLA.96
B.

Non-Environmental Cases that Help Develop a
Definition for “an Act of War”

Congress‘s use of the ―act of war‖ defense could have been
borrowed from international law as suggested by the court in Shell
Oil Co., or it could be a reference to the War Powers Clause in the
United States Constitution. The United States Constitution states that
Congress has the power ―[t]o declare War.‖97 The United States Supreme Court discussed the scope of the war powers and assessed
whether the right to confiscate foreign patents existed under the Trading with the Enemy Act in Farbwerke Vormals Meister Lucius and
Burning v. Chemical Foundation.98 The Court stated, ― ‗we are not
here concerned with an assignment of a patent or of royalties by the
German owners to the Alien Property Custodian. We are concerned
with their capture – an act of war.‘ ‖99 The Court‘s definition of ―an
act of war‖ appeared to include any action pursuant to the War Powers Clause in Article I of the United States Constitution that would
have been unlawful under normal circumstances, such as the taking

94

Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1062.
Id.
96
Id.
97
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
98
283 U.S. 152 (1931).
99
Farbwerke, 283 U.S. at 161 (quoting Farbwerke Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v.
Chemical Foundation, Inc., 39 F.2d 366, 371 (3d Cir. 1930)) (emphasis added).
95
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of property.100
Although the Court in Farbwerke appeared to recognize a
broad meaning for an act of war under the War Powers Clause of the
Constitution, other case law tends to narrow what an act of war might
mean by requiring: (1) that an actual war be in progress and (2) the
activity in question be of a military character.101 In Ribas y Hijo v.
United States,102 an action was brought by a Spanish corporation
against the United States to recover the monetary value for the use of
a Spanish ship that was seized during the war with Spain.103 The
United States Supreme Court found that the ship was seized as an
enemy vessel and was thus not used for gain upon which the plaintiff
could collect.104 ―The seizure, which occurred while the war was flagrant, was an act of war, occurring within the limits of military operations.‖105 The Court determined the seizure was ―an act of war‖ because the seizure took place as a part of military operations during a
formally declared and ongoing war and there was no element of a
contract.106 Similarly, in an earlier Supreme Court case, United
States v. Winchester & P.R. Co.,107 the Court held that there was ―an
act of war‖ when the seizure of railroad materials ―had no element of
contract, but was wholly military in character.‖108
Koohi v. United States109 involved a claim to recover damages
for an Iranian Civilian Airbus mistakenly shot down in 1988 by a naval cruiser, the USS Vincennes, which was dispatched to investigate
Iranian gunboats.110 The Ninth Circuit faced the task of determining
whether the events fell within an exception to the Federal Torts
Claim Act (hereinafter ―FTCA‖),111 which provides immunity to the
100

See Farbwerke, 283 U.S. at 161 (discussing how the purpose of the Trading with the
Enemy Act was to cease trade and take certain property or ―seize patents‖ to weaken the
enemy; these acts of capturing enemy property were ―an act of war‖).
101
Compare id. at 160-61, with Ribas y Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315, 322-23
(1904).
102
194 U.S. 315 (1904).
103
Ribas y Hijo, 194 U.S. at 321.
104
Id. at 322.
105
Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
106
Id. at 322-23. A contractual element might be seen in scenarios where the government
takes land for public use during wartime. Id.
107
163 U.S. 244 (1896).
108
Id. at 256-57.
109
976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992).
110
Id. at 1330.
111
See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006) (stating as an exception: ―[a]ny claim arising out of the
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United States for actions occurring in a ―time of war.‖112 Similar to
CERCLA‘s ―act of war‖ defense, the FTCA did not provide any definition for a ―time of war‖ and there is no legislative history for the
court to refer to determine the meaning of the ―time of war‖ language.113
Significantly, in Koohi, the court did make clear that it believed that there did not need to be any ―express declaration of war‖
for the events to qualify as an act of war.114 ―[F]rom a practical
standpoint ‗time of war‘ has come to mean periods of significant
armed conflict rather than times governed by formal declarations of
war.‖115 The court reasoned that this definition followed and enforced the purpose of the exception, which was to ―ensure that the
government will not be liable for negligent conduct by our armed
forces in times of combat.‖116 The ultimate holding as to the meaning
of what constituted a time of war was:
[W]hen, as a result of a deliberate decision by the executive branch, United States armed forces engage in
an organized series of hostile encounters on a significant scale with the military forces of another nation,
the FTCA exception applies. Under those circumstances, a ―time of war‖ exists, at least for purposes of
domestic tort law.117
In accordance with this holding, the court dismissed the charges under FTCA against the United States because the combatant activity
exception applied to the events culminating in the shooting down of
the Iranian Civilian Airbus.118 Although the Koohi definition was to
be applied to the FTCA exception, the congressional purpose and intent analyzed by the court seemed analogous to the possible purpose
and intent of the ―act of war‖ defense to CERCLA liability.
In Juragua Iron Co. v. United States,119 a case involving the
combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war‖).
112
Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1333.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 1333-34 (citing Vogelaar v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 1295, 1302 (E.D. Mich.
1987); Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. 46, 47-48 (D. Conn. 1971), aff’d, 455 F.2d 992 (2d
Cir. 1972); Morrison v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 78, 79 (M.D. Ga. 1970)).
115
Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1334.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 1335.
118
Id. at 1335-36.
119
212 U.S. 297 (1909).
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destruction of property during the Spanish war, the Supreme Court
referred to Ribas y Hijo and explained that there was no ―act of war‖
when an implied agreement provided for the payment of the property.120 During the Spanish-American War, troops that were fighting in
Santiago de Cuba were also facing the threat of yellow fever. 121 To
protect the health of the troops against the spread of yellow fever, an
order was issued to destroy sixty-six buildings privately owned by the
plaintiff by setting fire to each of the buildings. 122 The property was
located in Cuba and, at that time, Cuba was owned by Spain, the
enemy.123 The Supreme Court specified, without making reference to
a specific law granting such a right, that any enemy property could be
seized during wartime without compensation.124 Therefore, any implied contractual agreement to compensate for the taking of private
property would mean that the destruction of the property, for which
the plaintiff was trying to collect damages, was not an act of war.125
In 1898, the court in White v. United States126 distinguished
between property that was seized as an act of war and property that
was merely an appropriation for use by the army.127 When the property is seized as an act of war, the United States is not liable for the
resulting damages.128 This supports the proposition in Koohi that the
purpose of an ―act of war‖ exemption is to protect the United States
from liability for negligent acts which may occur during the course of
war.129
Based upon the cases discussed in this section, there remains
no absolute answer to what an ―act of war‖ inherently means, but it
can be inferred that a certain variety of acts relating to an ongoing
war may appropriately be included. By using the foregoing cases to
develop a working standard, it is possible to interpret what an act of
war should mean in relation to CERCLA‘s defense provisions. If all
of the pollutants dumped at the McColl site in the Shell Oil case were
deposited only during World War II, the defense would still not be
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 309-10 (citing Ribas y Hijo, 194 U.S. at 322).
Id. at 301.
Id.
Id.
Juragua Iron Co., 212 U.S. at 306.
Id.
33 Ct. Cl. 368 (1898).
Id. at 375.
Id. at 376.
Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1334.
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applicable because a contract existed between the oil companies and
the United States for compensation for the production—and disposal—of the avgas and its byproducts. The following section discusses
in further detail what the standard in environmental law should be by
applying the cases and standards analyzed above to CERCLA section
107(b).
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WHAT THE STANDARD FOR THE
CERCLA ACT OF WAR DEFENSE OUGHT TO BE

There should be three elements necessary to establish an ―act
of war‖ within the meaning of the defense under CERCLA section
107(b)(3) for a property owner to avoid strict liability: (1) the activity
causing the release must be a part of an armed conflict, but the armed
conflict does not need to be an actual declaration of war by Congress;130 (2) the activity causing the release of hazardous waste into
the environment must be military in nature;131 and (3) the activity
causing the release of hazardous waste should not be attached to any
contractual, implied or in fact, agreement for compensation of resulting damages from the hazardous waste to the environment.132 In addition to these three elements, the strict holding from Shell Oil Co.
must still be applied; even if there is an act of war as established by
this proposed three-element test, the act of war must be the exclusive
cause of the entire release of hazardous substances.133 The release
cannot merely occur in concurrence with an act of war or be exacerbated by an act of war, but the act of war must be the only in-fact
cause of the release into the environment. Furthermore, the act of
war may be an action taken by another country against the United
States; the act of war does not necessarily need to be the United
States‘ involvement in a war, which causes the production of hazardous waste, for the activity to qualify within the meaning of the statute.
Even with a working standard to apply in future scenarios, it
is still difficult to determine whether this defense could ever be suc130

See id. at 1333-34 (stating that an ―express declaration of war‖ is not required).
See Winchester & P.R. Co., 163 U.S. at 256-57 (discussing how an activity that was
military in nature was an act of war).
132
See Ribas y Hijo, 194 U.S. at 322-23 (describing how an act of war cannot be an activity in which the resulting damage is covered under a contract for repayment by the actor).
133
See Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1062 (rejecting the ―act of war‖ defense because the war
was not the sole cause of the release of hazardous substances at the McColl site).
131
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cessfully used because the defense is extremely narrow. CERCLA
was enacted with the intent that it be enforced against the property
owners as strict liability134 and having only a very narrowly applicable defense matches that intent. However, the restricted applicability
still leaves the question: will there ever be a situation in which the defense of ―an act of war‖ can be used or should be used? The answer
to that question may not be as difficult to find as it sounds. Not very
long ago, the United States was faced with a tragedy when the terrorist attacks on 9/11 destroyed the iconic Twin Towers in lower Manhattan and left behind a spread of hazardous waste that had to be
cleaned up.135 Similar to the hypothetical scenario presented at the
beginning of this Comment, 9/11 also raised issues of how to clean
the disaster, remove the debris, limit hazardous exposure to the community, and pay for the large cleanup costs.136
V.

ILLUSTRATION OF WHEN THE ACT OF WAR DEFENSE
MIGHT BE APPLICABLE SO AS TO LIMIT LIABILITY UNDER
CERCLA

On September 11, 2001, when the Twin Towers in lower
Manhattan were tragically brought down by terrorists who crashed
commercial airliners into the buildings, the remaining debris had to
be cleaned up and someone had to pay for it.137 The airplanes that
crashed into the buildings and the collapse of the Twin Towers that
followed covered the entire lower city in dust and debris.138 Within

134

United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167-68 n.11 (4th Cir. 1988).
See generally Associated Press, New York City Shuts Down, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/11/nyregion/11CND-NYC.html?scp=7&sq=sept.%2011,%202001&st=cse
(describing the terrorist attack that occurred that morning and the destruction that was caused in
lower Manhattan). See also Julian E. Barnes, Horror, Alarm and Chaos Grip Downtown Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/11/national/11CNDSCENE.html?scp=9&sq=sept.+11%2C+2001&st=cse, (describing the horrible events of the day
as each tower was hit and then subsequently fell).
136
See infra Section V (discussing the various issues and how the defense of war might
apply).
137
See Andrew Ross Sorkin & Simon Romero, A Day of Terror: The Insurers; Reinsurance Companies Wait to Sort Out Cost of Damages, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/business/day-terror-insurers-reinsurance-companieswait-sort-cost-damages.html?scp=6&sq=sept%2012%202001&st=cse (explaining the potential costs that are expected to be incurred from the devastating disaster of the terrorist attack
in lower Manhattan).
138
New York City Shuts Down, supra note 135. See also Barnes, supra note 135 (describing the blankets of dust and smoke that covered the city as people attempted to escape).
135
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twenty-four hours of the terrorist attack, analysts had already estimated that the cleanup costs would be around five billion dollars.139
Who was responsible for paying for this very large bill? According
to an article in the New York Times the day after the incident, ―dozens of insurers [were] expected to bear the cost of the damage, including the cost of the towers, which collapsed and burned after being struck by two hijacked airliners, as well as damage to the
surrounding area and the cost of office furnishings and equipment.‖140
More than just the physical destruction of the buildings had to
be monitored for cleanup purposes; environmental scientists also had
to analyze the effects on air quality from the dust and smoke that
were released to determine whether there would be extensive impacts
reaching far into the future.141 Under CERCLA, a release of hazardous substances into the environment also includes release into the air
and water.142 Fortunately, officials from the EPA reported to the public that tests conducted on air quality revealed there were ―no harmful
levels of asbestos, lead or toxic organic compounds.‖143 The EPA also reported that there were low levels, found in the dust near Ground
Zero, of lead and asbestos, but these levels decreased every day and
were below the level of concern.144
Although the EPA reported that the heath risks going forward
were minor, two months later there was still an ongoing concern for
firemen and workers at Ground Zero; one article in the New York
Times reported there were continuing dangers faced by workers including non-visible threats such as ―the toxins that have been measured in the dusty air, or the smoke that rises from the fires still burning deep underground.‖145 Another article published by the New
139

Sorkin & Romero, supra note 137.
Id.
141
See Andrew C. Revkin, Monitors Say Health Risk From Smoke Is Very Small, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/14/nyregion/14ENVI.html?scp=5&sq=sept.+14%2C+200
1&st=cse, (explaining that ―tests of air and the dust coating parts of Lower Manhattan appeared to support the official view expressed by city, state and federal health and environmental officials: that health problems from pollution would not be one of the legacies of the
attacks‖).
142
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8) (2012) (defining the environment as including ―surface water,
ground water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata, or ambient air within
the United States or under the jurisdiction of the United States‖).
143
Revkin, supra note 141.
144
Id.
145
Eric Lipton & Kirk Johnson, A Nation Challenged: The Site; Safety Becomes Prime
Concern
at
Ground
Zero,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
8,
2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/08/nyregion/a-nation-challenged-the-site-safety-becomes140
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York Times in 2006 discussed a movie, ―Dust to Dust: The Health
Effects of 9/11,‖ and stated that the contaminants released into the
environment were:
[M]ore than 400 tons of asbestos, . . . 90,000 tons of
jet fuel containing benzene; mercury from more than a
half-million fluorescent lights; 200,000 pounds of lead
and cadmium from computers; crystalline silica from
420,000 tons of concrete, plasterboard and glass; and
perhaps as much as two million pounds of polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons from the diesel-fueled fires.
Some of those substances are carcinogens; others can
cause kidney, liver, heart and nervous-system damage.146
Furthermore, contrary to what the EPA was telling the general public,
a health article reporting on the issue stated:
[T]he conditions at Ground Zero—in spite of Federal
and State warnings to the contrary—were exceedingly
toxic: hundreds of contaminants, including asbestos,
lead, mercury and benzene—to name a few—were
present in unprecedentedly high levels, both within the
billowing dust cloud that settled over Lower Manhattan and the surrounding areas, and in the emissions
from the Pile that smoldered for months afterward during the nine-month recovery and cleanup operation.147
Another report characterized the contents of the hazardous release in
two ways, (1) the physical collapse of the towers released ―pulverized
steel, glass cement, and other debris;‖ and (2) the fires caused by the
crashed airplanes that contained jet fuel released ―smoke and fumes,
including polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, lead, dioxin, and furans.‖148
The presence of the toxic contaminants at Ground Zero and in
prime-concern-at-ground-zero.html?scp=2&sq=A%20nation%20Challenged:%20the%20
Site,%20Nov.%208,%202001&st=cse.
146
Gates, supra note 2.
147
Claire Calladine & David Miller, The 9/11 Health Crisis, 911HEALTHNOW.ORG (last visited
Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.911healthnow.org/911healthnow/The_9_11_Health_Crisis.html (emphasis omitted).
148
Robert M. Brackbill, et al., Surveillance for World Trade Center Disaster Health Effects Among Survivors of Collapsed and Damaged Buildings, CDC.GOV (April 7, 2006),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5502a1.htm.
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the air all across lower Manhattan affected not only the workers at
Ground Zero but also the general public who lived, worked and attended school in the area.149 Under CERCLA, these hazardous releases of toxins into the environment should have been addressed and
were required to have been cleaned up.150 The limited response by
the government and the EPA to engage in the proper response under
CERCLA led to many adverse effects up to nine years later:
Afflictions range from chronic bronchial disease to
asbestosis, leukemia and cancers, plus a host of other
diseases including systemic organ failure for which
the etiology remains unidentified. As of June 2010,
836 WTC workers have died; an estimated 70% of the
70,000-plus First Responders have declared illnesses;
it is estimated by the World Trade Center Health Registry that 410,000 people have been ‗heavily exposed‘ to WTC toxins (includes Responders), and may
become seriously ill in the future.151
Hypothetically, had the United States government, including
the EPA, addressed the hazardous substances as a release under
CERCLA, owners of the buildings, office spaces, property and the
airplanes might have been called upon as PRPs under CERCLA section 107 to pay for the expenses of cleaning lower Manhattan.152
This is because all of the hazardous substances released as a result of
the terrorist attacks were materials and substances that were a part of
the buildings, property, and airplanes before the incident occurred.153
If the property or airplane owners were threatened with liability under
CERCLA section 107 for the cleanup costs associated with the toxic
dust and air near Ground Zero, the defense of ―an act of war‖ could
have been an appropriate means for them to avoid liability.154
The activity culminating in the disaster of 9/11 qualifies as an

149

Calladine & Miller, supra note 147.
See id. (stating that there was ―no government-mandated cleanup‖); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(23) (2012).
151
Calladine & Miller, supra note 147 (emphasis omitted).
152
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2012) (describing liability for the release of hazardous
substances).
153
See Brackbill, et al., supra note 148 (describing the matter that was released as originating from the collapse of the twin towers, surrounding buildings, and the fires caused by
the airplanes colliding with the buildings).
154
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
150
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act of war under the proposed standard set forth in the previous section. The first necessary element for establishing an act of war required the activity to be a part of an armed conflict.155 The two airplanes did not accidentally collide with the World Trade Center Twin
Towers; but rather, the airplanes were hijacked by enemies of the
United States and intentionally crashed into the buildings as an act of
terrorism.156 While at the time of the attack, there was no declaration
of war between the United States and the country to which the terrorists belonged, there did not need to be one so long as the hijacking
and crashing of the airplanes was part of an armed conflict.157 The
second element required to establish an event as an act of war is that
the activity must be military in nature.158 The men who carried out
the acts of terrorism against the United States received military training and used weapons in order to hijack the airplanes.159 Furthermore, the hijackers used the airplanes as a weapon in order to commit
an act of terrorism on American soil.160 Therefore, the events of 9/11
are military in nature and satisfy the second element. The third requirement is that there be no agreement of compensation for any of
the resulting damage by the actors.161 Al Qaida, led by Osama Bin
Laden, never expressed nor intended to compensate any of the loss
that the United States suffered; the acts were express undertakings of
terrorism meant to cause the United States and its people as much
loss as possible.162 Since all three elements could be clearly estab155

See Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1333-34 (discussing the need for an armed conflict, not an express declaration of war to constitute a time a war).
156
See generally Bin Laden Claims Responsibility for 9/11, CBC.CA (Oct. 29, 2004),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2004/10/29/binladen_message041029.html (describing
how Osama Bin Laden publicly claimed responsibility for planning and carrying out the terrorist attack against the United States).
157
Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1333-34 (explaining that a formal declaration of war is not a necessary prerequisite for there to be acts of war during an armed conflict).
158
See Winchester & P.R. Co., 163 U.S. at 256-57 (discussing how an activity that was
military in nature was an act of war).
159
Al-Qaida / Al-Qaeda Terrorist Training Camps, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida-camps.htm (last visited Sept. 23,
2012).
160
James Barron, Thousands Feared Dead as World Trade Center Is Toppled,
NYTIMES.COM (Sept. 11, 2001) http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/11/national/11WIREPLAN.html?pagewanted=all.
161
See Ribas y Hijo, 194 U.S. at 322-23 (describing how an act of war cannot be an activity in which the resulting damage is covered under a contract for repayment by the actor).
162
See generally Bin Laden Claims Responsibility for 9/11, supra note 156 (discussing
who was responsible for the attack and never mentioning any intent to compensate the United States for damages).
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lished, it is likely that the terrorist acts of 9/11 would qualify as ―an
act of war‖ within the meaning of CERCLA section 107(b).
Not only are the events of 9/11 likely to qualify as an act of
war, but the events would also satisfy the limitation that the act of
war be the sole cause of the release of substances.163 The airplanes
colliding with the towers caused the collapse of the buildings, which
directly led to the release of jet-fuel, mercury, lead, cadmium, glass,
concrete, steel particles and smoke into the air and water.164 There
was no release of such hazardous waste from the site before the
events, as there was in Shell Oil.165 The only cause for the release of
the hazardous wastes into the surrounding environment from the destroyed buildings was the act of war carried out by the terrorists
against the United States on September 11, 2001. Therefore, if
CERCLA liability ever became an issue for the property/building
owners, the defense of ―an act of war‖ would likely shield them from
strict liability caused by the terrorist attacks.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While Congress chose not to define an ―act of war‖ when it
drafted section 107(b) of CERCLA, the analysis of case law allows
for a reasonable inference to be adduced for the future use of the defense in environmental cases. There may not have been a successful
use of the defense in the past,166 but the defense serves a necessary
purpose in equity and remains good law. When hazardous wastes are
released into the environment through uncontrollable acts of destruction and war, holding private parties liable would not be just. This
logic is in line with the holding of Shell Oil and the overall intent for
liability under the general terms of CERCLA. The defense provision
protects PRPs from acts which may occur beyond their control, i.e.,
acts of terrorism.
As suggested in Section IV of this comment, for an effective
application and understanding of the act of war defense, there are
three requirements—the activity causing the discharge of hazardous
163
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (stating that the defense is only applicable when the resulting
damages were ―caused solely by‖ the defense).
164
See Brackbill, supra note 148.
165
See supra, Section III.a.i. (describing the facts of Shell Oil relating to the timing of the
creation of acid sludge and the dumping at the McColl site).
166
See generally Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045 (this is the only case in American history
for which the ―act of war‖ defense was raised under CERCLA and the defense failed).
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substances into the environment must (1) be a part of an armed conflict, (2) be military in nature, and (3) must not be connected to any
contract for compensation. These three elements, applied jointly with
the holding from Shell Oil, can help guide a successful use of the act
of war defense in future environmental cases brought under
CERCLA. The unfortunate events of the 9/11 terrorist attack against
the United States, the long lasting impacts of which the United States
is still attempting to mitigate today, provide a clear example of what
should qualify as an act of war to defend against CERCLA liability.
Not all acts in the future may be as clearly coverable by the act of
war defense as the events of 9/11, but the foregoing analysis of Shell
Oil and other case law outside the environmental practice area, illustrates that there are other events and actions beyond terrorism that
would fittingly qualify as an act of war.
To qualify as an act of war, the action does not have to be an
act undertaken by the United States or someone within the United
States; it can be another country or group taking action against the
United States that leads to an unforeseeable release of hazardous
waste within the United States. So long as the qualifying event is the
exclusive cause of the release of hazardous substances into the environment, and the activity is a part of an armed conflict, is military in
nature, and is not connected to any contract for compensation, then a
PRP who may normally be held liable for cleanup costs will likely be
able to defend against any unfair enforcement of the strict provisions
of CERCLA.
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